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Abstract We review and examine three market-based instruments to address the chal-
lenge of climate change: emission trading, emission taxes, and hybrid instruments. Our 
main contribution is the illustration and comparison of these instruments using recent 
results from theoretical research and practical policy experience. Hybrid policies that aim 
to combine taxes and permits emerge as a promising way forward. An additional contribu-
tion is that we also comment on two other related concepts, namely, innovation strategies 
and prediction markets. For the former, we show that, to make economic sense, the much 
publicized Asia-Pacifi c Partnership on Clean Development and Climate has to rely on the 
same basic tool as the other instruments, namely, relative prices. For the latter, we discuss 
how prediction markets can complement traditional scenario analysis by experts. They are 
likely to improve the practical implementation of all previously discussed methods.
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1 Introduction
Unabated climate change threatens to fundamentally change and indeed worsen 
quality of life on this planet. Measurements of global temperature show that the 
average temperature has augmented by about 0.74°C in the past 100 years, while 
the number and the frequency of extreme weather events like heat waves, mea-
gerness, strong rainfalls, and tropical storms have increased. For a scenario of no 
mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the increase of the global average 
temperature is estimated to be around 0.2°C per decade (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2007). In November 2006, the Stern Review (Stern 
2006) presented a dramatic scenario that could occur if nothing changes in the 
context of climate protection. The concentration of GHG in the atmosphere is 
about 430 parts per million (ppm) carbon dioxide (CO2), compared with 280 ppm 
CO2 before the Industrial Revolution. This concentration leads to an increase of 
global temperature by more than 0.5°C and will lead to a further increase of at 
least 0.5°C over the next few decades. If annual emissions do not increase above 
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today’s rate the GHG concentration will reach 550 ppm, which will probably lead 
to an increase in global temperature of more than 2°C (Stern 2006). To stabilize 
the GHG concentration at 550 ppm, global emissions will have to decrease by 
about 25% below today’s level. For a stabilization at 450 ppm, the decrease will 
have to be 70% until the year 2050 (Stern 2006).1 Similarly, the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts scenarios of a slow increase in 
globally averaged surface temperature between 1.1° and 2.9°C and scenarios of 
an extreme increase between 2.4° and 6.4°C for the twenty-fi rst century (IPCC 
2007). Stabilization of the GHG in the atmosphere between 445 and 535 ppm 
CO2 in 2030 would cost maximally about 3% of the global gross national product 
(GNP). In the third IPCC assessment report, an increase of global temperature 
by 1°C was equated with a global loss of about US $214 trillion over the next 50 
years. In the year 2050 alone, damages of about US $2 trillion have to be expected 
(IPCC 2001).2 Of course, there is great uncertainty attached to these estimates, 
but Weitzman (2009) shows that the economic consequences of fat-tailed struc-
tural uncertainty (along with uncertainty about high-temperature damage) can 
readily outweigh the effects of discounting in climate change policy analysis, thus 
calling for urgent action.
Because of the importance of the problem, much literature has dealt with 
optimal ways to address climate change with economic tools. It has long been 
recognized that command and control instruments (like fi xed standards over 
inputs, outputs, or technologies, or location controls) are inadequate to obtain 
the desired reduction of emissions in cost-minimizing ways. Therefore, we focus 
on market-based instruments that hold the promise of cost effectiveness.
This article reviews and investigates the theoretical setup and practical work-
ings of three different possible actions against climate change, and reveals the 
operating experience. The main contribution of the article is that it reviews, fol-
lowing the same criteria for all instruments, and draws on the most recent avail-
able fi ndings for all three of these basic instruments. While some reviews of 
individual systems are available, there exists, at least to our knowledge, no current 
article that compares all three systems. Such a comparison is important because 
in using a partial approach it is relatively easy to critique (or favor) one system 
1 For a critical discussion of the Stern Report concerning issues of the rate of discount and 
cost–benefi t analysis, see Tol (2006) and Nordhaus (2006).
2 Although climate change is a global problem, its impacts are often best appreciated by poli-
cymakers and citizens alike when broken down into effects for their own country. To illustrate 
the impact of climate change in Europe to readers in Asia, some results for Austria and 
Germany shall be considered by way of example: Vienna is faced with a doubling of the number 
of days with the maximum temperature exceeding 30°C within the next 50 years. The frequency 
of high maximum temperatures has increased in Vienna in the period of 1951–2000 over that 
for the period 1901–1950. The Schmittenhöhe (a well-known ski area), on the other hand, is 
faced with a reduction of days with maximum temperatures below 0°C by one third (Kromp-
Kolb 2003). Numbers for Germany show that the increasing numbers of natural disasters will 
lead to damages of about 137 billion Euros until the year 2050 (Kemfert and Praetorius 2005). 
A study by the ETH Zurich and Swiss Re found that the damages through winter storms in 
Europe will increase until 2085 up to 68% from 1975 values (SwissRe 2006).
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not keeping in mind that it may dominate (or be dominated by) other systems 
on another dimension. We study tradable permits, emission taxes (and subsidies), 
and a hybrid between permits and taxes. We cover the basic workings of emission 
trading and emission taxes (subsidies for reductions) only rather briefl y because 
a lot of literature is available on them. The third instrument—less known in 
Europe but important in the policy discussion in the US—is a hybrid instrument 
that combines trade and tax systems to optimize the advantages the two former 
systems have. The recent experience in Europe is of signifi cant interest for Asian 
economies. We argue that the European Emission Trading System (ETS) has 
likely failed in achieving effi ciency in its fi rst phase because too many permits 
were allocated for free. This resulted in excessive emissions in the ETS sector 
and produced an additional burden to mitigate pollution in the non-ETS sector. 
It may also have led to a lack of incentive to engage in emissions trading on the 
fi rm level. Hybrid policies are likely to be attractive for future policy adjustments 
because they allow scarce initial allocations of permits while still giving suffi cient 
safety to industry, should abatement costs turn out to be unexpectedly high.
Our second contribution is that we challenge a much-publicized approach 
focusing on technological progress. The governments of Australia, Canada, China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, and the USA are in favor of this approach as a comple-
ment to the Kyoto Protocol. They have documented their preference for this 
approach recently through the founding of the Asia-Pacifi c Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate (APP). Because of the dual characteristics of this 
strategy—technological progress and international diffusion—we refer to this 
approach as the innovation and cooperation strategy.3 Little specifi c information 
is available yet on this partnership, and it is to some extent still obscure exactly 
what the operational approach will be. What is clear after our analysis, however, 
is that this approach, too, will have to rely on a working price system.
Because all policy tools are strongly affected by uncertainty and diffi culties to 
predict future outcomes, we also propose to establish a “prediction market” for 
future technologies. On such a market, claims on the likelihood of various tech-
nological innovations are traded, thus using the aggregate knowledge of all 
market participants in addition to relying on estimates of policymakers or a few 
experts.
We begin in Sect. 2 with an explanation and evaluation of the different eco-
nomic instruments that support the fi ght against climate change. The emphasis 
here is on effi ciency and effectiveness. Section 3 takes account of the instruments 
with respect to several additional important dimensions, including ecological 
effectiveness and political feasibility. In Sect. 4, we focus on the issue of uncer-
tainty and propose prediction markets as an effective complement to existing 
ways of forecasting the future. Section 5 concludes.
3 There are other instruments that we do not discuss. Perhaps the biggest omission is that we 
do not deal with carbon sequestration and reforestation. We refer the reader to Lecocq and 
Chomitz (2001), Lubowski et al. (2006), Stavins (1999), and Stavins and Richards (2005).
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2 Overview of market-based methods to fi ght climate change
In contrast to many textbooks and general surveys, we especially direct our atten-
tion to issues relevant to Europe in order to see how the policies implemented 
fi t with the recommendations of economic theory; this in turn can then enrich 
our discussion of policy not only for Europe but also for other countries, includ-
ing countries in Asia. Because of the prominence of the debate in the USA, but 
not in Europe and in Asia, we spend considerable time laying out the operation 
mode and crucial issues of implementation of a hybrid policy. At the end of the 
section, we discuss a strategy that focuses on innovation and cooperation. 
Although this strategy is advertised as a new approach by the APP, at least from 
the currently available documentation of that partnership, the strategy appears 
to be consistent with and indeed a logical corollary of the other three approaches.
2.1 Emission trading
Emission trading is one of the fl exible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and 
shall therefore play an important role in reaching international climate targets. 
The Kyoto Protocol’s provision for an international cap-and-trade system paves 
the way for the implementation of the regional emission trading system in Europe 
(Stavins 2008). One important point why emission trading was chosen to help 
reach the Kyoto targets is that, like taxes, it allows emissions to be reduced where 
it is cheapest for the economy, that is, it is cost effective (Dales 1968; Montgomery 
1972). In a framework where permits are allocated for free, an emission trading 
system does not involve transfers from the private sector to the government vis-
à-vis an emission tax approach.
The basic setup is that a regulator sets an emission cap for a certain sector. The 
level of this cap depends on the target that should be achieved. The more ambi-
tious the target, the lower the overall cap is. When the overall cap is set, each 
participant (the individual fi rms) will get a certain allocation of emission allow-
ances. This allocation can happen in two different ways. The fi rst, which is used 
in the European Union (EU) ETS, is “grandfathering.” With this method, emis-
sion rights are mainly allocated according to the past emissions of each company. 
The alternative is to auction off allowances. We discuss these two approaches 
below.
In general, the EU ETS covers installations such as combustion plants, oil 
refi neries, coke ovens, iron and steels plants, and factories producing cement, 
glass, lime, brick, ceramics, and pulp and paper. Sectors or industries that are not 
covered by the scheme, such as the private sector, transport, or the building 
industry, have to be regulated by other (national) abatement measures in order 
to reach each national emission reduction target. To illustrate the quantities 
involved, Table 1 shows the allocated emission allowances of some large Euro-
pean companies. It becomes clear that because of the size of the market, even a 
low or moderate price of allowances is substantial, as is the potential cost for 
each individual company.
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To put the role of the emission trading program into perspective with the 
overall amount of emissions, it is instructive to consider the overall amount of 
CO2 emissions, which are shown in Table 2. Emission trading in the European 
Union only covers a part of these emissions. In the EU ETS, emission allowances 
for approximately 2.2 billion tons of CO2 were allocated per year for the period 
2005–2007. For 2008–2012, emission allowances for approximately 1.9 billion tons 
of CO2 have been allocated per year without accounting for changes in the cap-
tured installations and sectors by the scheme.
The second way to allocate the allowances is via complete or partial auctioning. 
Companies bid for the amount of emissions they would probably need and have 
Table 1. Emission allowances allocated to some European companies
Sector Company
Allocated allowances 
(1000 tons CO2) National 
Allocation Plan2005–2007 2008–2012
Steel ThyssenKrupp Stahl AG 48 190 98 552 Germany
Voestalpine 34 069 56 710 Austria
Electricity EnBW Kraftwerke AG 30 237 33 880 Germany
Vattenfall Europe Generation AG 
& Co. KG
198 607 187 887 Germany
Verbund 10 033 12 519 Austria
EdF 64 535 80 835 France
Refi nery OMV 8303 14 960 Austria
Shell 10 616 25 131 UK
BP 11 582 25 103 UK
Esso 10 871 16 591 UK
Source: National Allocation Plans of the different countries
Table 2. CO2 emissions of different regions (in million tons)
Year World EU-15 EU-27 China India Japan South Korea
1995 23 108 3277 4141 3013 916 1305 374
1996 23 903 3355 4242 3216 999 1328 408
1997 24 118 3301 4154 3157 1042 1322 424
1998 24 905 3347 4142 3022 1070 1287 364
1999 24 083 3321 4076 2735 1140 1318 396
2000 24 677 3349 4100 2740 1155 1344 431
2001 24 918 3418 4179 2800 1181 1341 438
2002 25 874 3409 4155 3532 1226 1328 446
2003 27 020 3488 4263 4146 1264 1376 454
2004 28 424 3508 4283 4881 1343 1391 466
2005 29 430 3486 4258 5380 NA 1401 NA
2006 30 047 3466 4258 5944 NA 1381 NA
2007 30 892 NA NA 6389 NA 1393 NA
Source: Eurostat, Internationales Wirtschaftsforum Regenerative Energien, Umweltbundesamt, 
United Nations Statistics Division
NA, not available
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to buy the certifi cates. This is generally seen as the preferred way of doing the 
allocation.4 First, auctions are more cost effective in the presence of certain kinds 
of transaction costs. Second, the revenue raised can be used to reduce other 
distortions. Note also that instruments such as tradable permits can create entry 
barriers that raise product prices, reduce the real wage, and exacerbate preexist-
ing labor supply distortions. This effect can be offset if the government auctions 
the permits, retains the scarcity rents, and recycles the revenue by reducing pre-
existing distortionary taxes (Goulder and Bovenberg 1996).5 Third, auctions 
provide greater incentives for fi rms to develop substitutes for CO2-intensive 
technologies. Fourth, due to the revenue raised by auctions, administrative agen-
cies may have a bigger incentive to monitor compliance (Ackermann and Stewart 
1985). Finally, grandfathering can lead unregulated fi rms to increase their emis-
sions in order to maximize the pollution rights that they obtain if there is a transi-
tion to a market-based system (Dewees 1983). For all these reasons, an auction 
of emission rights may be preferable to grandfathering, which could lead to the 
conclusion that the EU ETS is likely to be highly ineffi cient currently on this 
dimension.
In practice, and taking into account the political process, the auctioning of 
permits may not be preferred to grandfathering. One common assumption is that 
the regulated industries would oppose auctioning. But this is not the only pos-
sibility. For example, Lai (2008) considers the lobbying behavior of interest 
groups and shows that industrial lobbies may endorse an auction while environ-
mental lobby groups may support grandfathering of permits. In this framework, 
a cost-minimizing industry endowed with few free permits favors an auction 
because this allocation rule strengthens its political infl uence and empowers the 
industry to lobby for a greater share of the emission cap or rather a higher 
amount of permits and in consequence minimize the permit price.6
Within the revision and the preparation for a post-Kyoto period of the EU 
ETS, one central point is the intensifi cation of auctioning allowances from 2013. 
The proposal of the EU Commission concerning the revision of the EU ETS 
considers a replacement of the limited use of auctioning allowances (a 5% cap 
4 For an overview of the concepts of grandfathering and auctioning, we refer the reader to 
Cramton and Kerr (2002).
5 In economic literature, this mechanism is called the “double dividend.” The double dividend 
of an emission tax or an emission trading system results on the one hand from reducing emis-
sions (ecological dividend) and on the other hand from increasing welfare by using the revenues 
from the tax or the auctioning of permits to diminish existing tax distortions (economic divi-
dend). For an overview regarding the double dividend hypothesis, the reader is referred to 
Goulder (1995).
6 Lai (2008) shows as well that grandfathered permits will raise the industrial endowment effect 
and strengthen the environmental group’s lobbying power. Hence, in the case that the emission 
cap is defi ned in the subsequent stage, environmentalists will support grandfathered permits 
within this public choice context. The empirical analysis of Svendsen (1999) arrives at the con-
clusion that environmental lobby groups in the US advocate grandfathering in order to arrange 
stricter reduction targets.
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in the fi rst and a 10% cap in the second trading period) by auctioning of at least 
60% of the total number of allowances. This consists of a full auctioning approach 
within the power sector and a partial auctioning of 20% for energy-intensive 
industries.7
When the initial allocation is complete, trading can start. Companies that have 
more certifi cates in their portfolio than they need (net suppliers) can sell these 
certifi cates on the market to companies (net purchasers) that have to cover their 
emissions with additional permits. Thus, the certifi cate price results from the 
interaction of the supply of certifi cates (the emission cap) and the demand behav-
ior of emitting fi rms (the aggregate marginal abatement costs). In principle, in 
the presence of perfect information, no transaction costs, a perfectly competitive 
trading market, and no government intervention, trading will result in an eco-
nomically effi cient outcome independently of the initial distribution of permits 
(Montgomery 1972), because marginal abatement costs are equated in any equi-
librium.8 Conversely, this independence result does not necessarily hold when 
there is uncertainty (and fi rms are risk averse), when there are transaction costs, 
when some fi rms have market power in either allowance or product markets, or 
when fi rms receive different regulatory treatment. Also, when some market par-
ticipants are not minimizing costs or when current allocations are tied to produc-
tion in previous periods, allocations may become important (Hahn and Stavins 
2010).
Some recent work has considered the extent to which emission markets operate 
effi ciently. An active market has developed for allowances on the European CO2 
market (Parsons et al. 2009); this liquidity is a necessary condition for market 
effi ciency. One consideration in this context concerns transaction costs. The exis-
tence of transaction costs can lead to a wedge between market participants’ 
marginal costs. Thus, allowance prices diverge from the zero transaction cost 
7 We cannot deal with the whole revision process concerning the centralization and harmoniza-
tion of cap setting and allocation rules, the enlargement of the scope, the competitiveness of 
covered sectors, and the integration of third countries to increase the effectiveness of the EU 
ETS in this article. For an overview, we refer the reader to Ellerman and Joskow (2008) and 
Convery (2009).
8 By contrast, Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) point out that the presumption that equal marginal 
abatement costs are the correct condition for effi ciency is not strictly correct. The reason for 
this is that, simply, a dollar to a person in the developing world does not have the same welfare 
implications as a dollar to a developed world person. What matters are the real opportunity 
costs. Formally, the authors fi nd that Pareto effi ciency requires the marginal cost of abatement 
in each country to be inversely related to the country’s marginal valuation for the private good. 
This has strong policy implications: if richer countries have a lower marginal valuation of the 
private good, then at a Pareto-effi cient allocation, they should have a larger marginal cost of 
abatement than the lower-income countries. With diminishing returns to abatement, this implies 
that they should push abatement further. Summarizing, the allocation of property rights in a 
tradable permit system is important for effi ciency, not merely for distribution, if environmental 
quality has a direct impact on wellbeing and marginal valuations of private goods differ strongly 
across countries.
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competitive equilibrium.9 Another question is whether prices are, in fact, unpre-
dictable, as the effi cient markets hypothesis suggests. Applying technical analysis 
and naïve forecasts, Daskalakis and Markellos (2008) show that three of the most 
important spot and future markets for European CO2 allowances deviate from 
the weak form of market effi ciency. That is, returns of CO2 allowances exhibit 
predictability and simple trading methods can be applied to generate signifi cant 
risk-adjusted profi ts. These fi ndings may be traced back to the facts that the EU 
ETS currently still suffers from immaturity and features constraints regarding 
short selling and banking.10 A third consideration is the intertemporal effi ciency, 
that is, the link between spot and futures prices. Accounting for price dynamics 
of CO2 future contracts of the EU ETS, Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2009) fi nd 
that spot and futures prices were linked by the cost-and-carry approach between 
December 2005 and the end of the fi rst trading period.
In the long run, direct and indirect linking of the EU ETS with other regional 
or national systems will offer an opportunity to increase liquidity of and partici-
pation in the market for tradable allowances, thus improving the functioning of 
the market. By an intensifi ed linking of the EU ETS, any given global reduction 
target could be implemented at lowest cost (Jaffe and Stavins 2007). Furthermore, 
the linking of separate tradable permit systems could form an important element 
of a post-2012 climate policy architecture and endorse negotiations about eco-
logically more effective reduction targets (Jaffe et al. 2009). In the short term, the 
EU ETS has focused on (indirect) linkage with emission reduction credit pro-
grams like the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol.
2.2 Emission tax
The emission tax is a near relative of emission trading.11 While emission trading 
focuses on the amount of emissions that are allowed in general, the emission tax 
focuses on the price side of this relation. Because different companies may have 
different abatement costs, they will react in different ways to an emission tax. 
Some companies will reduce more than others. If the tax is higher than the mar-
ginal costs of abating, at least some emissions will be reduced by the company. 
 9 Cason and Gangadharan (2003) use laboratory experiments to show that in a setting with 
decreasing marginal transaction costs, the prices and traded quantities vary less from the effi -
cient level if the initial distribution of allowances is not accomplished cost effectively. The 
reason is that a more defi cient distribution of allowances is in need of a higher transaction 
volume to accomplish the cost-effective allocation, which induces lower marginal transaction 
cost in a framework of decreasing transaction costs. Furthermore, in the case of constant mar-
ginal transaction costs, transaction prices and traded quantities are independent of the incipient 
endowment.
10 Ellerman and Montero (2002) empirically evaluate the temporal effi ciency of the US Acid 
Rain Program allowing for trading and banking. They fi nd that in contrast to the general per-
ception of excessive banking in this program, banking worked effi ciently.
11 Subsidies essentially work symmetrically, and we do not explicitly discuss them here. Olsson 
et al. (2006) discuss them in the European context and provide experimental evidence on their 
competitive impacts.
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This will happen as long as the tax rate is as high as the costs of abating the next 
unit of emissions. If the tax rate is chosen in a way that is as high as the price 
would be in an emission trading scenario, then there would be no difference 
between these two ways of climate protection.
Calculating the optimal tax rate (or the optimal level of emissions with a trad-
able permit program) of course requires substantial knowledge about benefi ts 
and costs of mitigating emissions. Applied to the context of climate change, what 
is the optimal policy? Cline (2004) found a path for optimal carbon tax and 
optimal percent cutback in emissions with the DICE99CL model. He found that 
an optimal abatement strategy should be very aggressive with an emission cutback 
of about 35%–40% in the early stages, increasing to 50% by 2100, and 63% by 
2200. Therefore adequate carbon taxes would be necessary, which should be 
about US $170 per ton around the year 2005, rising up to US $246 by 2025 and 
US $367 by 2055. It is obvious that these numbers are of a different order of 
magnitude from what is being discussed right now for possible CO2 taxes.
2.3 Hybrid systems combining emission trading and emission taxes
The prices seen on the European CO2 market are of a different order of magni-
tude from the prices calculated by Cline (2004). In Fig. 1, we present the Intraday 
Spot Price from the start of emission trading at the European Energy Exchange 
(EEX) and BlueNext on 9 March 2005 up to the most recently available data.
As one can see from the data presented in Fig. 1, during the year 2006 the 
emission permit price varied between 310 and 330, which is far from the emission 
prices that have been calculated by Cline (2004). Even in that time period, we 
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Fig. 1. Spot price of a ton of CO2 permits on the European market. On 21 January 2010, 
the exchange rate was 31 ≈ US $1.41. Source: BlueNext, European Energy Exchange
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can thus conclude that the EU ETS does not achieve social (or allocative) effi -
ciency. The cost effectiveness of the reduction may also have been constrained 
simply because little reduction of emissions was required. Trading did take place 
(in fact, trading volume in the ETS rose more quickly than it did at the start of 
the SO2-permit trading program under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990), 
but in the absence of a baseline of how much trading should have occurred, it is 
hard to evaluate the outcome.
The price path of CO2 permits in the EU is not only noteworthy for its level 
but also for its highly volatile behavior. Despite the fairly low expectations of 
maximum price caps of about 315, the permit price climbed up to 330 until spring 
2006. A few days later, the information that the market as a whole was “long 
permits” began to circulate, meaning that too many permits were allocated. This 
emerging of an overallocation in the trading sector of the EU ETS resulted in a 
price collapse unusual for commodity markets. This episode illustrates that there 
is signifi cant uncertainty in the market. Part of it probably has to do with the fact 
that emission trading is a new policy for Europe, but part is inherent in the way 
the market is set up. Because of banning the possibility of transferring permits 
from one trading period to another by most member states and the resulting lost 
in value of the CO2 permits with the new trading period in 2008, the price effects 
following from overallocation were intensifi ed.12 Parsons et al. (2009) provides a 
discussion of this problematic design feature. Nonetheless, even without these 
institutional features there is signifi cant uncertainty. The spot price ranging ini-
tially between 322 and 327 illustrates the increased value of CO2 permits gener-
ated by stricter allocation caps for the second trading phase.
The key assumption that drives the equivalence between emission permits and 
emission taxes in the previous two sections is the absence of uncertainty. In par-
ticular, the regulator was assumed to know exactly what upper bound to set on 
emissions or what tax rate to set in order to achieve the social optimum. The 
price is defi ned by the tax in that the optimal level of abatement is generated 
while the quantity-based approach can be used to fi x the optimal quantity to 
generate the market price. In practice, however, uncertainty is rampant. Indeed, 
both the (marginal) costs of abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and the 
(marginal) benefi ts of avoiding climate change are highly uncertain. For example, 
Pizer (2002) calculates that the marginal cost of achieving the 1990 emissions 
level in 2010 would involve a marginal cost between US $0 and US $180 per ton 
carbon13 (for a 95% confi dence interval). The marginal benefi ts are approxi-
mately constant independent of the reduction of emissions, and are between US 
$0 and US $24 per ton carbon.
12 The so-called banking of emission allowances shifts permit trading into future trading periods 
and consequently represents an instrument of risk management with respect to drastic price 
changes and allowance shortages (Maeda 2004). For an analysis of the reduction of abatement 
costs via banking of permits in the Kyoto framework, see van Steenberghe (2005).
13 One ton of carbon corresponds to 3.67 tons CO2.
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As Weitzman (1974) shows in his seminal paper, price instruments (like taxes) 
and quantity instruments (like emission permits) behave asymmetrically in the 
presence of benefi t and/or cost uncertainty.14 In this setting, an environmental 
agency has to choose the instrument of pollution control ex ante with regard to 
the expected degree of welfare being generated ex-post. Weitzman’s main result 
is that taxes minimize the deadweight loss from choosing the wrong policy if the 
marginal costs of abatement are steeper than the marginal benefi ts, while emis-
sion permits are preferred otherwise.15 Because of the features of cost and benefi t 
functions in the context of climate change, some researchers therefore argue for 
the superiority of taxes as a policy instrument for climate change. Intuitively, 
because marginal costs are assumed to be steeper than marginal benefi ts, taxes 
are preferable because they put a fi xed upper bound on the costs fi rms will have 
to bear. By contrast, emission permits may produce, in equilibrium, an extremely 
high price that may create substantial overall effi ciency losses.16
In a dynamic setting, Biglaiser et al. (1996) show that under the assumption of 
complete information, a quantity-based approach may not induce the social 
optimum even if the market is perfectly competitive because an optimal system 
of tradable permits exhibits time inconsistency. By contrast, tax approaches to 
regulate pollution may be able to achieve the social optimum and feature time 
consistency. Montero (2002) shows that with incomplete enforcement and cost 
and benefi t uncertainty, a quantity instrument performs relatively better than a 
price instrument; when marginal benefi t and cost curves have the same slope, the 
quantity instrument should be preferred. The reason for this preference is that 
incomplete enforcement is endogenous to the actual cost of control. Under 
incomplete enforcement, unexpectedly high costs cause noncompliance of some 
fi rms, and thus the advantage of prices over quantities is mitigated. On the other 
hand, Newell and Pizer (2003) fi nd that in a setting of stock pollution with rising 
optimal stock levels, more effi cient control is often provided by a price-based 
approach. Overall, there is no defi nitive advantage of either prices or quantities; 
the relative dominance depends on the circumstances.
Economists have long considered ways of combining the advantages of emis-
sion trading with the advantages of emission taxes (Roberts and Spence 1976).17 
One such hybrid instrument uses certifi cates as the main instrument, but there is 
14 We comment on other differences below.
15 The analysis of Adar and Griffi n (1976) using quadratic cost and benefi t functions provides 
the same results while Weitzman’s fi ndings are based on approximately quadratic cost and 
benefi t functions.
16 Newell and Pizer (2003), for example, fi nd that taxes generate up to nearly fi ve times the 
expected welfare gains of tradable permits in a 40-year horizon.
17 We do not deal with a combination of marked-based instruments with environmental stan-
dards for certain regions here. The aspect of a combination of permit trading and ambient 
concentration limits is considered by Krupnick et al. (1983) and McGartland and Oates (1985). 
The SO2 permit trading program under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 and the usage 
of a tradable permit system for NOx and SO2 under the Regional Clean Air Markets (RECLAIM) 
in Los Angeles can be cited as real implementation of a combination between a tradable permit 
approach and environmental standards (Bennear and Stavins 2007).
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a backup system that should protect the participating companies from an extreme 
increase in prices for the permits. This backup system works with a so-called 
safety valve that gives companies the possibility to buy permits from the national 
authority at a fi xed price that is usually higher than the expected market price. 
For the case that the market price does not develop as expected, companies have 
an option to buy certifi cates at a fi xed price. This makes it easier for companies 
to undertake the necessary calculations because they have an overview of the 
maximum costs they may be faced with. Companies can choose whether to buy 
permits in the market or to buy them from the national authority, but their choice 
will depend on the market price. However, if the market price is higher than the 
trigger price, companies will pay the trigger price to the national authority, which 
can be seen as a tax per unit of emission. As long as the price of the permits is 
below the trigger price the system will work like a trading scheme providing cost 
effi ciency with uncertain costs and a fi xed amount of emissions. If the trigger price 
is reached because of abatement costs higher than anticipated, a so-called safety 
valve is provided and the system changes to a tax scheme with fi xed costs but 
uncertainty over the level of emissions. Roberts and Spence (1976) show that the 
simultaneous implementation of price and quantity approaches minimizes 
expected total costs in contrast to the isolated usage of a price-based or quantity-
based instrument. The application of this hybrid system can be interpreted as 
protection of each instrument against the malfunction of the other.18
Figure 2 shows how the hybrid system works (cf. Jacoby and Ellerman 2004). 
The national authority allocates permits in the amount of Q1. Marginal social 
Q1
MSC
0
MAC1
MAC2€
P2
P1, PSV
Level of Emissions 
Q2  QH
x
y
z
a
Fig. 2. A hybrid system
18 Baumol and Oates (1988) study a hybrid system that allows the fi rms to sell their permit to 
the government if the price falls below a certain “price fl oor,” which can back up dynamic 
ineffi ciencies.
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costs of emissions are described by MSC. If the marginal abatement costs are 
low, as is shown by the marginal abatement cost curve 1 (MAC1), the market 
price for certifi cates will be P1. But if marginal abatement costs turn out to be 
high as is shown by the marginal abatement cost curve 2 (MAC2), the resulting 
market price would be P2. This is much higher than expected, leading to an effi -
ciency loss, because the quantity of permits should have been higher. This is 
where the hybrid policy comes in. In this policy, companies can buy additional 
permits from the national authority without limit at a safety valve price PSV, and 
overall costs will be much lower as in an emission trading system. Due to the 
higher level of abatement costs, emissions are abated to level QH and permits in 
the amount of QH − Q1 are bought.
Finally, the level of emission under the hybrid system QH will be slightly higher 
compared than the optimal level of emission Q2, which leads to lower total costs 
under the MAC1 and higher social cost of the emission level within the range 
between QH and Q2. The welfare effi ciency loss of the hybrid system (the area 
x − y − z) is less than that for the situation without the safety valve (the area in 
the triangle 0 − x − a). Therefore, the hybrid system gives companies more security 
concerning the fi nancial side of the system, because they know the maximum 
amount of costs that will arise if the trigger price comes into play.
In the economic literature, the implementation of a hybrid system has been 
seen recently as an important approach in fi ghting global climate change (Jacoby 
and Ellerman 2004; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002; Pizer 2002). The effi ciency 
gains from the hybrid policy for climate change have been estimated to be sub-
stantial. Pizer (2002) uses a modifi ed version of the Nordhaus (1994) DICE 
model. It is true that the hybrid policy only slightly improves on the pure tax 
system; the expected social benefi ts of a global policy to combat climate change 
are about US $300 billion in both cases. However, both the tax and the hybrid 
system are dramatically superior to the optimal tradable permit solution, by a 
factor of fi ve or more. Thus, given that the hybrid system has a signifi cant appeal 
vis-à-vis the tax system (i.e., the ability to fl exibly distribute the rents associated 
with emission rights), it appears as a very attractive option.19 To our knowledge, 
there is no analysis of the relative gains of this instrument specifi cally for Europe.
How high the trigger price should be is a matter of ongoing discussion. Some 
argue that the trigger price should be high so that it is used only in unexpected 
situations when the demand for emission rights increases as a result of unex-
pected actions. However, if the trigger price is set too high, the basic problem of 
a deadweight loss in the case of unexpectedly high marginal abatement costs 
arises. On the other hand, if the trigger price is set too low, not all marginal ben-
efi ts of reducing emissions are internalized. Numerical results confi rm this intu-
19 A drawback of this prototypical hybrid system is that it necessitates monetary exchanges 
between the private sector and the government in case the trigger price is reached (which may 
be seen categorically as a bad idea). Newell et al. (2003) consider policies that replicate the 
behavior of the policy without monetary exchanges.
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ition. For example, Pizer (2002) calculates that the optimal trigger price is very 
similar to the optimal tax level. If, in 2010, the same world emissions as in 1990 
should be obtained, he calculates that the optimal trigger price is around US $20 
per ton carbon.20
2.4 The innovation and cooperation strategy
We now turn to what at fi rst appears like a completely different way of possible 
climate change policies, but what, in the end, turns out not to be a separate instru-
ment on its own. The idea behind this strategy has entered public discussion with 
the consultation of the Asian-Pacifi c Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate (APP). This agreement between Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, 
South Korea, and the USA is focusing on a new way to achieve climate protec-
tion hand in hand with economic performance. The partners of this agreement 
want to focus on the development of new technologies and an increased coopera-
tion in developing and distributing these technologies. The idea the governments 
involved in this partnership had when they founded this partnership was that 
innovation of new technologies reduces greenhouse gas emissions, which helps 
them to fulfi l their climate protection targets and provide a higher level of energy 
security. As a side effect of these technology advances, indeed, economic theory 
suggests that only technological progress can boost economic growth in the long 
run.21
Since July 2008, 123 projects have been registered in which government agen-
cies and companies from the sectors of aluminum, buildings and appliances, 
cement, cleaner fossil energy, coal mining, power generation and transmission, 
renewable energy and distributed generation, and steel are involved. Some illus-
trative examples of the APP’s project activities include the management of 
bauxite residue in aluminum production, the promotion of a standardized energy-
effi cient lighting, the transformation of waste to fuel in cement kilns, and the 
improvement of carbon-capture technology for coal-fi red power plants. Further-
more, it covers the development of strategies to guarantee health and safety in 
coal mining, the implementation of a shared best practice approach in the power 
generation sector, and the intensifi cation of the usage of solar power and cleaner 
steel technologies.22
20 Recall that these estimates are based on what is seen by many as an ineffi cient goal of emis-
sions reductions themselves. The estimates of Cline (2004) optimize both the quantity and 
the price.
21 This was recognized already in Solow (1956). Only more recently did economists think about 
how technological progress develops endogenously. The seminal contribution is Romer (1990), 
but a huge literature, which we cannot review here, has since followed. We refer the reader to 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) for a comprehensive overview.
22 Detailed information of the different sectoral projects and outcomes of the Eighth 
Policy and Implementation Committee Meeting in October 2009 can be found under http://
asiapacifi cpartnership.org/default.aspx.
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The basic question, though, is: what are the incentives for technological prog-
ress? Like for any other economic activity, people may have intrinsic incentives, 
but for most entrepreneurs engaging in the business of technological innovation, 
there is also an extrinsic part. A useful framework for thinking about technologi-
cal progress has been provided by Schumpeter who separated technological 
progress into three different phases. The fi rst one is called invention and is 
defi ned as the phase in which new ideas are created. In the second phase, these 
ideas have to be developed into commercially useable products. This phase is 
called innovation. All these innovations can only push an economy forward if 
they are widely used. This happens in the third phase of the cycle of technological 
change named diffusion. The critical point is that each of these phases is guided 
and regulated by incentives. Incentives come from outside effects like (relative) 
prices or offi cial regulation.
One way to interpret the APP is that it wants to give the same relative incen-
tives as other existing policies in Europe and elsewhere, but with a different 
method. In particular, one interpretation is that it favors rewarding environment-
friendly technologies rather than punishing environment-hostile technologies. 
Economically, the effect is the same and the two approaches are isomorphic, but 
politically they may be worlds apart. Where the fi rst three approaches discussed 
in this article use taxes and quantity restrictions, it is likely that the Asia-Pacifi c 
Partnership would favor research subsidies. They might also consider a policy 
innovation such as “minimum number of inventions bonds” (the rough equiva-
lent of a quantity instrument).23 These instruments would be set with very similar 
goals in mind as discussed before: social effi ciency and cost effectiveness.
Of course, participating countries tend to have different interests concerning 
environmental protection and economic development. Therefore, because a 
common environmental target is missing in contrast to the Kyoto targets, each 
country will try to maximize its utility, which may inhibit the effectiveness of the 
Asia-Pacifi c Partnership being based so much on cooperation. Moreover, one 
problem with subsidies is that they can be misappropriated fairly easily. La Porta 
et al. (1999) indeed show a positive correlation between government transfers 
and subsidies and corruption, although the overall evidence and interpretation 
of this correlation is less clear. Buscaglia and van Dijk (2003) found that “high 
levels of corruption are associated with high distortions and abuse of discretion 
in the granting of state subsidies to the private sector.” Olsson et al. (2006) discuss 
further implementation issues if subsidies were to be used in Europe. One aspect 
that we cannot deal within this article is how the international diffusion of 
technological progress is governed. Diffi cult issues in industrial organization, 
23 Recall that an emission permit allows a company to emit a ton of a particular pollution, thus 
causing social damages. Similarly, with an “invention bond” a company would be allowed to 
receive the right to use a new technology. Companies that are not innovative enough to invent 
themselves are better off buying these bonds, leading to a more effi cient social allocation. 
Clearly, this is rather utopian, but the basic principle should apply here.
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international intellectual property law, and other areas are relevant here, and 
they have to be analyzed separately.24
In short, we challenge the view that this is a separately viable economic instru-
ment to combat climate change. Not only is it relatively obscure how precisely 
this approach would be put into operation, but it is also clear that it is practically 
meaningless without a price system that is supported by one of the three core 
approaches discussed earlier.
3 Additional criteria for choosing between instruments
So far, we have discussed the four instruments mainly in terms of effi ciency and 
cost effectiveness. All market-based instruments are likely to yield cost-effective 
solutions, and their effi ciency always depends on the degree of information the 
policymaker can secure regarding optimal pollution levels. In this section, we 
consider additional criteria for choosing among instruments, in particular, eco-
logical effectiveness, political feasibility, fi nancial impacts, and dynamic incen-
tives. It is important to evaluate these criteria for all instruments at the same time. 
In evaluating the instruments, we also draw on existing experiences especially in 
Europe. As discussed earlier, uncertainty is perhaps the dominating aspect of 
climate change policy and therefore is an extremely important criterion for 
evaluating policy choices. It permeates all the issues discussed in this section. We 
have studied one important aspect (the question of deadweight losses) above, 
and we will return to the issue of uncertainty again in Sect. 4, where we ask how 
we can approach it using a market-based instrument.
3.1 Ecological effectiveness
Ecological effectiveness describes how well an instrument works to reach the 
environmental goal the policy focuses on. Emission permits and emission taxes, 
which are near relatives to each other, have one of their biggest differences in 
this point. Emission trading sets an overall cap of emission allowances that are 
supplied to the companies that take part in the system. This cap is limiting overall 
emissions from the emission trading sector. Ecological effectiveness therefore is, 
at least in theory, 100% because no more emissions than allowed should be 
24 Recent work has revealed that a technology transfer from a developed country (north) to a 
developing country (south) in a situation with no trade, the north country will, in equilibrium, 
and even if the technology is transferred free of costs, always like to transfer the technology to 
the south. The south will always be better off if it accepts the technology. In this case, the global 
pollution level will always stay within the initial levels. In a second step, trade was introduced 
between north and south and different outcomes were found. In this two-commodity model, 
the north is specialized in the production of the nonpolluting commodity and south is special-
ized in the production of the polluting commodity. The north could be better off if it transferred 
technology, but once it decides to transfer then it would be done completely. The technology 
transfer cannot guarantee a stable global emission level under a trading scenario (Mukherjee 
and Rübbelke 2006).
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emitted.25 Because emission trading is a new instrument in European environ-
mental policy, not much experience has been gained as yet. Experience in the 
United States with an SO2 trading system that started in 1995 has shown that the 
allowance trading program had positive welfare effects, taking into account both 
ecological and economic aspects, with benefi ts six times greater than costs (Stavins 
2003). As mentioned earlier, while the quantity is fi xed (at least to the extent that 
emissions can be properly measured), the price of emissions and abatement is 
uncertain.
In contrast to an emission trading system, an emission tax system cannot guar-
antee an exact amount of emissions as the outcome. The reason is that with a 
fi xed price of emitting that is set by the tax and unknown marginal abatement 
costs, the reduction of emissions is uncertain. The reduction can be higher than 
in a trading system if the tax is higher than the market price, but the reduction 
can be lower if the tax is below the market price. Ecological effectiveness of a 
tax system depends on the tax rate, which should be set ideally with the knowl-
edge of the marginal abatement costs. Usually, these costs are only available to 
each individual company but not to the authority and therefore the tax has to be 
set without this information. Thus, meeting an environmental target with a tax is 
diffi cult and the tax has to be adapted until the initial target is reached. This trial 
and error process needs time and is diffi cult in a political context if the system 
of emission taxes is not commonly agreed upon by all political parties. In other 
words, the standard, static uncertainty analysis by Weitzman (1974) and others 
that is already discussed above has to be extended by including dynamic aspects. 
If the deadweight losses in one period of time turn out, ex post, to have been too 
high, then in the next time period the instrument may be adjusted. However, even 
if adjusting the tax rate were to be socially optimal, such an adjustment would 
not necessarily be politically possible. In other words, political inertia can be an 
additional cost of choosing the wrong tax rate in the fi rst place.
Experience with taxes in Europe has shown different results. In Norway, for 
example, high carbon taxes have led to low effects on emissions. This may be 
because the tax does not work for the sources in which it was levied and was not 
used for other sources where it would have worked (Bruvoll and Larsen 2004). 
Simulation of the effects of ecological tax reform in Germany has shown that a 
reduction of CO2 emissions can be achieved without jeopardizing employment. 
In the model, CO2 emissions are reduced step by step until they are 3% lower 
than in the business-as-usual scenario without ecological tax reform in 2010, 
whereas GDP increases by up to 0.5% and employment increases by around 
0.75% when compared with the business-as-usual scenario (Kohlhaas 2005).
The hybrid system combines the trade and tax systems not only in institutional 
settings but also in the issue of ecological effectiveness. Thus, the ecological target 
is reached as long as the hybrid system is moving in the trade area of the system. 
If the trigger price is reached and additional certifi cates can be bought from the 
25 This does not mean that the correct target is met, but that the society can meet the target 
with certainty.
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national authority, the certifi cate cap increases and the ecological target becomes 
diluted and the outcome is unclear. One can see that the ecological effectiveness 
of the hybrid system depends on the setting of the trigger price. If the trigger 
price is set near the market price for emission allowances, then a small increase 
in demand can increase the price for the allowances over the trigger price. In this 
case, allowances can be bought from the national authority and the ecological 
target is missed. Therefore, the policy should be designed with a trigger price high 
enough so that it is only reached in unpredictable situations to keep the focus on 
the environmental effect of the system.26
Ecological effectiveness is a problematic point in the innovation strategy. The 
output of research and development, one of the most important points in a good 
working innovation strategy, cannot be easily predicted. The potential that new 
inventions have to protect the climate are hard to foresee in advance. It is impos-
sible to say that new inventions in the next 10 years will reduce emissions by 50% 
because nobody knows exactly what environmental protecting potential new 
inventions will have. Because there are no binding goals in this strategy, the whole 
ecological effect will depend on the progress of technology, on the intensity of 
international cooperation, and on the exchange of technologies between coun-
tries or even companies. All these aspects are hard to predict. We return to this 
issue, and especially the possibility to forecast future technologies using market-
based tools, in Sect. 4.
3.2 Political feasibility
Political feasibility implies the level of acceptance that a policy has in the public 
eye. If more (and more powerful) people are in favor of a certain policy, it is 
easier for the political authority to implement this policy without compromising 
their chances for reelection. This is a major incentive for governments in their 
choice of policy instruments.
One relevant factor infl uencing the feasibility of a policy is the number of 
people that are affected by the policy. For example, in the case of a tax, this factor 
is defi ned by the amount of money that the tax costs each individual. In the case 
of emissions this article is focusing on, that means how the broad public or the 
majority of voters are affected by emission trading, taxes, or other policies. 
However, with interest groups playing an important role in political decision 
making, small lobbies may be powerful when it comes to negotiations about new 
political activity. Representatives of the industry sector, which is made up of few 
people in comparison with, for example, the large number of workers that are 
represented by the unions, may have a lot of political power because of the capital 
they represent.
26 Murray et al. (2009) pick up the potentially insuffi cient ecological effectiveness of a cap-and-
trade system with a safety valve and suggest an allowance reserve approach. This system pro-
vides a fi xed price ceiling and a maximum number of permits to be issued, which means that 
the ecological target is supported by ensuring a quantitative limit of permits.
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In the case of emission trading as it is used today, most people are not directly 
affected. In Europe only large companies in electricity generation and industry 
have to take part in the emission trading system while small businesses and 
households are excluded. From this point of view, emission trading has a good 
political enforceability. Voters are indirectly affected, however, through increas-
ing prices that are the results of the higher costs companies are faced with. 
However, as it is diffi cult for consumers to have an exact view of the reasons for 
increasing prices in detail, emission trading can be seen as an instrument rela-
tively easily implemented. Stavins (2007) argues that environmental advocacy 
groups (generally supporting command-and-control instruments) strongly prefer 
tradable permits vis-à-vis a tax approach because the price-based policy gener-
ates a highly visible cost of environmental protection. Regarding permit alloca-
tion, an allocation without charge may be easier to implement than taxes or 
auctioned permits, because the industry’s mitigation cost are less visible and less 
burdensome. Furthermore, free allocated permits alleviate forming majority 
coalitions by providing more control to regulate the distributional effects.27
It may, however, also be the case that people do not like the uncertainty that 
goes with new policies. In this case, they will be more opposed than they should 
be. Of course, that argument may be moderated once one considers the active 
and powerful role of lobbies, sometimes of small but important constituencies, 
play in shaping the policy process and its outcomes.
Taxes are frequently viewed with skepticism. Thus, introducing an emission tax 
has to be done carefully if a government does not want to lose its mandate at the 
next election. As is the case in a trading system, the number of people who are 
directly affected by the tax will affect the acceptance or otherwise of the tax and 
the chances for reelection of the government. Because additional taxes on emis-
sions will increase the prices of different goods, amongst others electricity, nearly 
all people are affected at least indirectly by such a policy.28
A hybrid policy is, as the trading policy, a strategy that is not well known among 
the broad population. At least in terms of its principles, it can be “sold” as some-
thing other than a tax, giving it a natural advantage. The empirical analysis by 
Pizer (2002) shows that a hybrid system is only slightly more effi cient than a pure 
tax approach. But with regard to political feasibility, the hybrid policy may be 
favorable to a pure price-based approach because on the one hand it provides 
27 With regard to the political economy of market-based environmental policy, we refer the 
reader to Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) who examine the political process of permit alloca-
tion within the US Acid Rain Program.
28 There is little systematic evidence on how people feel about environmental taxes. Halla et 
al. (2008) analyze how satisfaction with democracy in European countries varies with environ-
mental quality and policy. They fi nd that citizens in countries in time periods with higher 
environmental or energy taxes tend to be less satisfi ed with the way democracy works in their 
country, but citizens are more satisfi ed if more environmental policies are enacted. They explain 
this result with the fact that a measure of the quality of democracy is how well it resolves col-
lective action problems, but that by and large individuals prefer not to pay for environmental 
quality.
20 S. R. Goers et al.
(in the case of gratis allocation) acceptance within the industry sector and on the 
other hand allows distribution of the rents generated from the additionally sold 
emission allowances (Bennear and Stavins 2007). Thus, the task of implementing 
the policy should incur less resistance from the majority of the population.
The political enforceability of different systems can be very different from 
country to country. On a general level, Europeans are more used to taxes as a 
regulating instrument, so it is easier to implement such a hybrid instrument than 
in the United States where taxes are seen as an evil from the very fi rst idea and 
a lot of work has to be done to convince people of the benefi ts of such a system. 
From this perspective, it is quite puzzling that Europe adopted an emission 
trading program for CO2 in the fi rst place.
The extent to which the public is concerned by a hybrid system depends on its 
design. The number of companies or individuals that are affected depends on the 
approach used. If an upstream approach is used, far fewer companies are affected 
because the system starts working at the top of the carbon chain, namely import-
ers and producers of fossil fuels, while a downstream approach affects many 
companies and individuals as the duty of providing certifi cates is shifted into the 
direction of the end users (Boemare and Quirion 2002). Furthermore, the choice 
of sectors that are regulated by a trading system affects the public. It makes a 
difference if only the energy sector is captured by an emission trading system or 
if public and especially private transport are included.
From the political side, the innovation strategy seems to be the easiest one to 
implement. Companies are not faced with any binding reduction targets or taxes 
and therefore prices for energy and products that require fossil resources do not 
increase as a result of the policy. Because technological progress and innovation 
are positive signs for an economy, political authorities will fi nd it easy to support 
research and development without compromising their chances in the next elec-
tion. However, once one thinks about the second part of the innovation strategy, 
namely, the coordination of technology transfer, one becomes more doubtful 
about the ease of implementation. Loosely speaking, every country has an incen-
tive to free ride. Worse still, that incentive is not only present in the technology-
sharing phase, but already in the innovation phase. In the worst case, all incentives 
for technological progress might evaporate.
3.3 Financial impacts
Financial impact in this context implies how consumers in a country with a regu-
lation policy are affected in monetary terms. Because all policies increase costs 
of companies more or less, the question is how companies will pass on these costs 
to consumers.
Practical experience with emission trading in the European Union has shown 
that although emission certifi cates were allocated for free, companies have inte-
grated the costs for certifi cates as real costs into their calculation and prices have 
increased (Woerdman 2001). This has been apparent since the start of the Euro-
pean emission trading scheme, especially in the electricity sector. Sijm et al. 
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(2006) show by empirical estimates that the pass-through rates of costs of CO2 
allowances for the power sectors in Germany and the Netherlands vary between 
60% and 100% depending on the carbon intensity of the marginal production 
unit and various other market-specifi c or technology-specifi c factors. Verband der 
Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft reported in May 2006 that the German 
energy sector makes an annual surplus of 35 billion by including the price of 
certifi cates into their electricity price calculation (Verband der industriellen 
Energie-u. Kraftwirtschaft 2006). For the UK, calculations show an increase of 
wholesale power prices of £3.50 to £10.50 per MWh over the forecast period to 
2020 as a result of these windfall profi ts.29 This should increase the profi t of the 
UK power generation sector by £800 million per year (IPA Energy Consulting 
2005). In theory, the ecological effects of regulation and the fi nancial impacts 
should be the same as with a tax policy and who has to bear the additional costs 
should depend on the slope of the respective supply and demand curve.
In the hybrid system, the same logic applies. Companies are faced with higher 
costs as a result of the policy, and they may be able to pass on the costs. Whether 
companies or consumers pay the larger part again depends on the slope of the 
demand and supply curves.
For research and development policy, it is diffi cult to predict the fi nancial 
impacts. First they depend on who is fi nancing research and development: govern-
ment or companies. If we talk about publicly fi nanced research and development, 
it is clear that it has to be fi nanced through taxes. Thus, taxes have to be either 
increased (which is frequently distortionary and thus creates social costs) or 
public spending has to be cut in other areas to leave taxes unchanged. Firms can 
engage in research and development on their own to realize comparative advan-
tages. The government may also decide to motivate companies, if fi rms do not 
engage in a socially effi cient level of research and development on their own. As 
discussed in more detail in the next section, incentives for companies to start 
research and development activities can come from an emission trading program 
or from taxes, both of which increase the price of emitting CO2 and force com-
panies to fi nd measures not to pay these additional costs.
In terms of political feasibility, promotion of research and development through 
lower taxes or tax deductions has the advantage of neutrality concerning deci-
sions about the topic and the character of research projects on the companies’ 
part. Taxation benefi ts present only a small barrier for companies to obtain fi nan-
cial support, which is especially important for small and middle-sized companies. 
The conditions to receive a benefi t are transparent compared with other methods 
of public support, and for companies it is easy to plan because the rules of receiv-
ing a tax reduction are known in advance (Hutschenreiter and Aiginger 2001). 
However, in contrast to an innovation program where a fund is fi xed for each 
period, a tax incentive amounts to losses in tax revenue, which leads to higher or 
new taxes to compensate for this loss.
29 On 21 January 2010, the exchange rate was £1 ≈ US $1.62.
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3.4 Dynamic incentives
Besides analyzing the static cost effi ciency of environmental instruments, the 
generation of dynamic incentives for technological change and innovation play 
an important role, whereas the innovation and cooperation strategy is not the 
only policy that requires the consideration of dynamic aspects. Other policies 
should also be designed to encourage companies to continuously improve their 
emission reduction techniques. Market-based policies such as tradable permits 
and taxes not only have the static advantage of cost effectiveness, but also 
dynamic incentive advantages.30 Snyder et al. (2003) show empirically that change 
of relative prices induced exogenously or by the implementation of a certain 
policy may provoke technological change, and, thus, the achievements of different 
policy instruments can vary. In general, it is important to assess the effects of a 
preexisting framework of regulation while evaluating the effects of alternative 
instruments on technology innovation and diffusion.
An emission tax provides a continuous incentive for reducing emissions, 
because every unit of emission that is not emitted saves money for the company. 
As long as reduction measures are cheaper than paying the tax, companies will 
engage in research to reduce emissions or adopt existing emission-reducing tech-
nologies. An emission trading systems provides, in principle, the same dynamic 
incentive as a tax system. Every unit of emission a company does not emit pro-
vides an additional certifi cate saleable on the market. Thus, companies are inter-
ested in reducing emissions because it also reduces their costs.
Within the analysis of an emission trading system with respect to the dynamic 
incentives, a distinction regarding the possible allocation metrics has to be made. 
Under the assumption that the diffusion of new technologies reduces the demand 
for permits relative to the supply and therefore reduces the permit price, grand-
fathering diminishes the incentive of emitters covered by the system to evolve 
environmental innovations. The higher the diffusion of new technologies, the 
higher the value of the permit and the benefi ts from selling surplus permits is 
reduced so that a free allocation constrains the dynamic incentives. By contrast, 
the auctioning of permits generates the incentive to use new technology because 
in the long run costs from purchasing permits can be reduced (Milliman and 
Prince 1989).
Because a hybrid system combines tax and trade systems it also has the dynamic 
incentive of continually increasing reduction efforts. As in the two former cases 
the dynamic as a whole depends on the price. The higher the price or the tax, the 
longer a dynamic incentive to reduce emissions is given.
30 Other policies should also be designed to lead companies to improve their emission reduction 
techniques continuously. Recall that in the case of an emission standard companies do not have 
any incentive to improve their technology once the level set by the authority is reached. This 
policy, which is not part of this paper, has no dynamic incentive at all. For an empirical analysis 
concerning the dynamic incentives of environmental regulation by taxes, technology adoption 
subsidies and technology standards we refer the reader to Jaffe and Stavins (1995).
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The dynamic incentives of the innovation strategy depend on the design of the 
research and development policy. If research and development is supported by 
national authorities, the direction of research and development activities can be 
guided as well as the range of the different sectors that should be covered by the 
activities. The dynamic incentive or the incentive to permanently increase the 
level of technology depends in some way on the will of the authority and the 
fi nancial support it is providing to research and development. If a national author-
ity is interested in a permanent technological improvement, the fi nancial, orga-
nizational, and political background must be provided. If these preconditions are 
set, the chances for permanent progress in environmental technology are given.
4 Dealing with uncertainty
As discussed earlier, both emission permits and taxes are cost-effective instru-
ments, which means they allow society to achieve a specifi ed quantity or price 
goal at minimum cost. We discussed earlier how the economic effi ciency of emis-
sion permits and taxes depends on the quality of information the regulator has 
about benefi ts and costs, and how hybrid instruments have been proposed to 
combine the best of both. For the innovation and cooperation strategy, it is much 
more diffi cult to predict even theoretically what will happen, simply because 
innovations are, by nature, hard to predict. There is a very strongly market-based 
tool that allows feasible policy decisions in such a context, which is called a “pre-
diction market.”
It has long been known that speculative markets do a great job of aggregating 
relevant information. In fact, they often perform better than forecasting institu-
tions and Roll (1984) has pointed out that orange juice futures improve on 
weather forecasts. Horse race markets beat horse race experts (Figlewski 1979). 
The Economic Derivatives market run by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank 
outperforms economists in predicting economic outcomes (Gürkayanak and 
Wolfers 2005). Oscar markets (e.g., the Hollywood Stock Exchange) make more 
accurate predictions than columnists (Pennock et al. 2001). Both real and play-
money markets have generated more accurate forecasts of the likely winners 
of NFL football games than all but a handful of 2000 self-professed experts 
(Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004). Election markets beat national opinion polls (Berg 
et al. 2001), and corporate sales markets beat corporate sales forecasts (Chen and 
Plott 1988). Prediction markets have also been applied to forecast infl uenza out-
breaks (Nelson et al. 2006). In all of these cases, we are in a similar position as 
when trying to predict which technology will next be invented and adopted in 
the case of technology that allows us to diminish greenhouse gases.
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2008) provide a survey of recent research on prediction 
markets. Scholars have considered how to translate market prices into probabili-
ties (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2005). Intuitively, if more people expect that a (well-
specifi ed) event will happen, more people will buy an asset that pays off 100 
monetary units if that event occurs. For example, suppose we construct a market 
where an asset is traded that pays off 100 monetary units if the average CO2 
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emissions of cars falls below 50 g/km. It is unknown if and when such a technol-
ogy will become available. However, the market price of such an asset is likely 
to give policymakers and other fi rms a good indication of how likely it is. Obvi-
ously, there are many implementation issues to be dealt with in this context. For 
example, what is the exact sample of cars that is considered? Is it just prototypes 
(in the spirit of Schumpeter’s innovation stage) or is it only mass-produced cars? 
Hanson (2003) shows that even though there may be many thousands or millions 
of combinations of events that a market might trade, it is still feasible to construct 
a liquid and informative market. Finally, issues of moral hazard (while having 
played a role in the closing of the Policy Analysis Market in the USA in July 
2003; Hanson 2006) are generally not seen as insurmountable obstacles.
Another issue may also be of concern to policymakers. In some sense, predic-
tion markets establish a derivative market in that the price of the entity being 
traded depends on the probability that the “underlying,” namely, the technology 
comes into existence. There is a long, but inconclusive discussion in fi nance and 
economics whether the introduction of derivatives, such as futures, leads to 
increased volatility of the underlying. Some have found such an effect; others the 
opposite; yet others have found no effect.31 Consider the introduction of a predic-
tion market in a market where fi rms are already subject to a tradable permit 
system, such as in Europe. Conceptually, what might happen is that the technol-
ogy prediction market leads to more volatile views on abatement technologies, 
thus leading to more volatile emission permit prices. There is, to our knowledge, 
no study that specifi cally addresses this concern in the context of prediction 
markets. An overall assessment of this consequence would also have to determine 
the economic cost arising from more volatile emission permit market prices and 
how they compare with the benefi ts obtained from the prediction market. In 
particular, fi rms may suffer from more volatile spot prices. However, volatilities 
can be hedged with appropriate instruments, and the cost to fi rms would there-
fore consist primarily in the costs of the hedge. For example, Chesney and 
Taschini (2008) provide an approach for CO2 option pricing. As the market for 
options on emission permits grows more liquid, this cost decreases, but it will still 
remain an important factor. Understanding the overall welfare effects of predic-
tion markets in this specifi c context thus remains an important area for research.
In short, prediction markets in principle appear as an extremely important 
complement to other market-based policies for combating environmental prob-
lems that are surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty. The one potential draw-
back seems to be an increased volatility of emission permit prices, although 
31 Seminal contributions showing an increase in spot price volatility due to derivatives trading 
include Figlewski (1981), Stein (1987), Harris (1989), and Lee and Ohk (1992). By contrast, 
Bessembinder and Seguin (1992) and Brown-Hruska and Kurserk (1995) provide evidence 
suggesting that active futures markets are associated with decreased stock market volatility. 
Finally, Santoni (1987) and Edwards (1988a,b) fi nd that daily and weekly volatilities of the S&P 
500 are not different after the introduction of futures. Darrat and Rahman (1995) and Darrat 
et al. (2002) also found no correlation of S&P 500 and DJIA jump volatility with derivatives 
trading.
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existing research indicates that it is far from certain that derivatives are respon-
sible for increased spot market volatility. More detailed analysis of this possibility 
must be left for future research, but it seems clear that especially the innovation-
based strategy would benefi t tremendously if accompanied by a market-based 
forecast of technological innovation and diffusion.
5 Conclusions
All three basic strategies that are presented in this article show potential for 
addressing climate change. Emission trading has a clear goal concerning the 
reduction of emissions because the overall cap of allowed emissions is set at the 
beginning. Environmentalists may favor emission trading from a purely ecologi-
cal viewpoint, because with the help of the cap it is possible to control the total 
amount of emissions. Controlling the amount of emissions is more diffi cult using 
an emission tax. In this case, the regulator has to have information about marginal 
abatement costs of the individual companies and the whole economy. This infor-
mation is not well known, and the optimal tax rate to achieve a certain target has 
to be set in a trial and error process, which is hard to implement from a political 
point of view. Because there is much evidence that the marginal cost curve is 
steeper than the marginal benefi t curve in the context of climate change, effi -
ciency considerations at fi rst favor taxes. However, a hybrid system that uses a 
permit system with a safety valve may also do very well. We have discussed how 
the different instruments can be evaluated with respect to various criteria. Impor-
tantly, they are all cost effective, but they vary with respect to ecological effective-
ness, fi nancial impact, dynamic aspects, and political feasibility. The substantial 
advantages of the hybrid approach, on theoretical, practical, and politico-
economic levels lead us to regard this instrument as very promising for the post-
2012 period in Europe.
On the international level, climate change is combated by the Kyoto Protocol, 
an international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework on Climate 
Change between industrialized, emerging, and developing nations. The protocol’s 
major feature is the provision of binding targets for industrialized countries for 
reducing GHG emissions to an amount of an average of 5% against 1990 levels 
over the 5-year period 2008–2012. However, implementation of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol has been criticized by economists with respect to the nonparticipation of 
key countries of the global GHG emission, the short time path of action, and the 
nonexistence of fi rm-level, market-based policy instruments (Olmstead and 
Stavins 2008). Key principles regarding the negotiation process of a post-Kyoto 
agreement are the establishment of a global cap-and-trade approach that con-
nects regional and national tradable permit systems and consequently integrates 
developing countries. Furthermore, a harmonization of domestic actions to 
combat climate change should be induced by a portfolio of international treaties 
and an international adjustment of carbon taxes. Besides the development of a 
particular climate policy framework, the promotion of technology transfer and 
reforestation, the reformation of the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism, and 
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a linkage between global climate policy and global trade policy are inevitable 
issues of a future arrangement (Aldy and Stavins 2008).
We have also given an economic interpretation of the ideas expressed in the 
basic mission statement of the Asia-Pacifi c Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate. This partnership intends to promote technology as a way to deal 
with global environmental problems. Probing deeper, one recognizes that the 
drivers of all three Schumpeterian phases of technological progress—invention, 
innovation, and diffusion—are incentives. Promoting clean energy alone with 
goodwill most likely is not going to be enough as long as fossil energy is cheaper. 
Therefore, using taxes or trading to make fossil energy more expensive is a way 
to set an incentive that helps to develop cleaner technology quicker than it would 
be without such fi nancial incentives. Useful complements to emission taxes and 
emission permits are subsidies and quantity-based tools that promote technologi-
cal progress. To our knowledge, no analysis similar to the many studies analyzing 
optimal emission taxes and permits is available for the subsidies approach.
Existing studies have a hard time incorporating the notion that technology will 
change over time. More generally, environmental policy, in particular such long-
term policy as that related to climate change, has to struggle with the signifi cant 
uncertainty surrounding benefi ts, costs, and available technologies. Environmen-
tal effects of technologies in development can be estimated but not predicted 
with certainty. Following the experience of such diverse areas as weather fore-
casting, horserace betting, macroeconomic variables, and elections we know 
today that “prediction markets” (where assets are traded and value depends on 
the probability that a certain event occurs) can play a powerful role in providing 
effective advice. In particular, they can aggregate information, often more accu-
rately than experts can. While this market could conceivably lead to more volatile 
emission permit prices, the potential advantages made available by a more effec-
tive knowledge and information aggregation mechanism also appear large.
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